过去两年间，西方多国都面临通胀高企和利率抬高对经济带来的负面影响，包括欧美多家银行倒闭。美联储等多家西方金融机构都在警告，未来数月内仍有较大经济危机风险，并担心可能爆发2008年金融危机以来最严重的经济衰退。

近日，前挪威财政部副大臣、前冰岛央行署理行长斯凡·哈拉尔德·伊加德（Svein Harald Øygard）接受了观察者网专访。他在其2020年发行的《在风暴中心：冰岛的崩溃和惊人的复苏》一书中，讲述了自己2009年任冰岛央行署理行长前后冰岛爆发金融危机的情况，以及冰岛如何成功克服困境。在采访中，他分享了自己对“冰岛经验”的见解，以及对当下潜在经济危机的预判。

【采访、翻译/观察者网 李泽西】

观察者网：您书中记录的情况主要发生在2009年，但到了2020年才将其出版。为什么要等这么久呢？

伊加德：这其中涉及不少敏感的内容，我不想因此毁掉其他人的事业和生活。有时候只有过了一定的时间，大家才能以开放的态度看待过去，而我也需要一定的时间进行思考。

关于2008年金融危机有很多著作，有些讲述了这场危机的导火索，还有很多讲述了危机期间的情况。而据我所知，我写的这本书是唯一一本广泛涉及危机后局势的书，这很大程度上才是这本书的亮点。比如，我们在危机后的一年中是如何处理经济事务，使冰岛能够回到经济增长的轨道上，解决债务问题。实际上，危机后的债务比危机前要少，这是出乎很多人意料的。解决债务的过程也持续了数年时间，到2018年才彻底结束。据我所知，冰岛是世界上唯一实现了这一目标的国家。

《在风暴中心：冰岛的崩溃和惊人的复苏》：斯凡·哈拉尔德·伊加德（Svein Harald Øygard）著 ，张文韬、郭茁芊 译，中信出版社

观察者网：冰岛为何选择您——一个挪威人——担任央行行长，您又为何接受？作为外国人，在履职上有过困难吗？

伊加德：我认为冰岛选择我，是因为我是90年代初应对挪威金融危机团队的一员，其中的许多经验教训也非常适用于冰岛。当冰岛处于危机之中时，需要一位央行行长，他们得出结论，临时央行行长应该是一个挪威的伙伴。他们要求我接受这份工作。

我为什么接受了？这首先是因为我认为被召唤到邻国接受这样一份职位来是一项荣誉。当然，我也喜欢挑战，当时冰岛央行行长是我可以胜任的最大挑战。

观察者网：您为何半年就离职了？

伊加德：这实际上是一个特殊情况，因为冰岛宪法规定，公职不能由外国人担任。冰岛可以豁免临时央行行长，但不能豁免常任央行行长。这是我只能暂任冰岛央行行长的原因。否则，他们就必须修改国家宪法。他们确实修改了法律，使我能够担任临时职务。但如果我留下来，他们还需要修改宪法，这对任何国家来说都是一个重大变化。

观察者网：我想，这确实说明冰岛当时有点走投无路，不得不在法律上做一些调整，让冰岛以外的人来清理他们的烂摊子。

伊加德：是的。有趣的是，冰岛宪法是在1262年制定的，冰岛议会应该是全世界最古老的议会，他们于1262年在一个叫辛格韦德利（Thingvellir）的地方召开会议，制定出了统治国家的规则，其中规定冰岛的所有高级公务员职位都应由冰岛人担任，但2009年2月27日他们调整了法律，第二天我就得到了这份工作。

2009年，伊加德任冰岛央行署理行长

观察者网：为什么冰岛是唯一允许系统性银行崩溃的国家？你认为冰岛的这种方法最终比拯救银行更好还是更差？

伊加德：在许多其他国家，人们常说银行“大到不能倒”。在冰岛，银行大到无法拯救。它们在经济中所占的比例实在太大了，而且其中的资金主要源自外币，比如美元和欧元等等，使得即使冰岛想拯救银行，国内也没有足够的货币可用。

这就是冰岛银行倒闭的原因，该国的三家银行占银行系统超过 90% ，在一周内集体破产，这造成了巨大的损失，因为它加剧了危机。但最终，事实证明这也有一定好处，因为拯救银行的成本并没有由国家和公民来承担。

观察者网：关于美国当时救助大银行的做法，很多人认为这给未来产生了道德风险；根据您的判断，从长远来看，您认为救和不救银行相比，哪种做法更好？

伊加德：我认为这很难说。当然，一般来说，允许一家银行倒闭的社会成本是巨大的，这基本上会威胁到整个金融体系的稳健性。拯救银行的代价是潜在的道德风险，银行所有者在危机前可能会承担过多的风险以提高收益，因为他们知道如果银行陷入困境，政府基本肯定会赔付他们。

但我认为，现在至少实股权所有者、银行所有者中已经清楚认识到，如果银行违约，他们将失去大部分资产价值。因此，我认为在现代银行体系中，从所有者的角度来看，道德风险较小。

观察者网：冰岛的复苏对其他国家有什么启示，尤其对于当下？

伊加德：冰岛确实对大多数国家带来很重要的启示，主要的经验是，如果遇到问题，要正确解决，尽早做出坚决的决定。不要试图拖延时间、举棋不定。与许多其他无法解决困境的国家不同，冰岛的决策就是坚决的。

从经济、金融的角度来看，通常情况下，如果一个国家的国内生产总值下降10个百分点，那就是非常严重的经济危机，相当于收入损失10%，但这一般来说是可以控制的，你只需要应对挑战。问题在于，太多国家花太多的时间争辩谁应该承担责任，而不是解决问题。这就好比你和许多朋友一起去餐馆吃饭，花了一大笔钱；最后，你们必须自行决定如何分担账单，而不是为此大打出手，拆毁整个餐厅。不幸的是，许多国家的做法无异于后者，花费大把时间争论谁该买单，而不是以公平、公正的方式分担账单。

观察者网：如果有机会自己不付出任何代价，让其他人买单，那大家显然都会至少做出尝试。

伊加德：你说得对。我认为这与文化、政治体制的合法性、公平性有关。如果有些人试图“逃单”，那么解决问题就会变得更加困难。我认为这很大程度上是冰岛和许多其他北欧国家的优势，这些国家都曾遭受过金融危机的打击：挪威和瑞典是在90年代初，丹麦、芬兰则更早一些。我们都经历过金融危机，但与希腊、西班牙、意大利和阿根廷等国家相比，我们都能够非常迅速地度过危机。

观察者网：在中国，地方政府和一些公司也遇到了债务问题。鉴于中国文化等方面的实际情况，您对如何解决这些问题有什么建议吗？

伊加德：我认为很难对任何外国提出建议，对中国也是如此。当然，普遍发生的情况是，有些公司背负了太多债务，这意味着股权的所有权价值与债务相比太低。我一般建议是，尽一切可能找到解决办法，甚至将部分债务转为股权，让债务持有人拥有企业的股份。这样做通常就能解决危机，而不会给整个经济带来更广泛的挑战。因此，应该及早行动，尝试重组实体并处理问题，而不是选择一种会导致整个国家出现问题的处理方式.

江苏淮安：大运河畔房地产建筑楼群

观察者网：回到2008年，对于次贷危机的成因，前美联储主席伯南克认为，就是国会政府华尔街出于自身目的故意纵容房地产泡沫，您认为之后美国次贷危机还会产生吗？

伊加德：是的，当然。通常情况下，金融危机的起点是债务过多。一些实体，可能是银行、家庭，也可能是政府，都会因为举债过多导致危机。当然，通过举债，企业可以发展壮大，消费可以更快增长，这对许多人来说当然很有吸引力。

这正是挑战所在。在泡沫经济的环境下，人们大量举债，似乎在推动经济强劲增长，资产价值也随之上升。在任何经济体系中，尤其是在市场经济中，总会有举债过多的诱惑。现在，世界上债务规模太大，而债务的分配方式又加剧了财务问题的风险。如果举债过多，就会引发危机。

观察者网：您认为我们该如何改变文化或社会结构，以提倡更长期性的思维，而不仅仅是短期关注国内生产总值的增长？

伊加德：我认为一种方法是非常密切地观察当下局势。负责监督这些公司的机构，如国际货币基金组织，还有评级机构，看到债务高举时应发布警告。当然，政策制定者也应当谨慎，银行本身更加要规避风险，而我们大家都要抵御诱惑，不能为了赚快钱而让自己和社会承担风险。

观察者网：您如何看待今年银行倒闭事件？您认为中央银行采取了正确的应对措施吗？

伊加德：首先，我们已经经历了近20年通货膨胀率不断下降的周期，这又导致利率水平不断下降。因此，随着通胀上升带来的高利率，许多机构都受到了挑战。

最令人惊讶的是，这些银行破产发生在利率抬高周期的初期。当然，硅谷银行破产本身就很奇特，购买美国政府债券居然也能破产，之前没有人认为这会发生。

我认为中央银行做了适当的反应，他们介入并重组了银行，把存款转移到其他机构，承担了债务。

同样令人惊讶的是，从那时起就一直很平静，过去九个月里基本没有银行破产，尽管利率上调的进程仍在继续。这意味着未来几个月很可能会发生更多的金融问题，因此，我认为我们都应该为此做好准备。我相信金融监管机构已经做好了准备，我希望各国央行也做好准备，因为本轮危机远未结束。

3月，硅谷银行突然倒闭

观察者网：在过去两年里利率不断下降，几乎没有通货膨胀的常态发生了根本性转变。即使是在欧洲，人们也经历了通货膨胀，利率也可能会大幅抬高。未来几年，您认为世界经济和企业将如何适应这一新的现实？

伊加德：我认为，大多数西方国家将经历一段时间的痛苦。我们都被逐年下降的利率宠坏了，现在利率又在上升。当然，利率上升是有意的，这是对抗通胀的措施。我认为通胀压力依然存在，而且相当强劲，有多重不同的原因。但在通胀压力减弱之前，加息仍将继续。

企业能做什么？如果企业没有缓冲资金，就需要建立缓冲资金，大家都应该更加谨慎，希望我们能顺利渡过难关。前面肯定会有颠簸，我们也需要为此做好准备，也许我们需要对银行偶尔倒闭有更大的容忍度，只要决策者干预果断，这并不一定是世界末日。

观察者网：金融界仍在探索的具体教训是什么，还是已经达成共识？

伊加德：我认为金融行业已就其中一部分教训达成了共识，用于解决冰岛危机的一些工具和方法，已经被国际货币基金组织（IMF）所采用，甚至被纳入其机构的工具箱中，用于解决其他国家的危机。冰岛改变了世界，因为我们当年共同开发的许多机制实际上被证明是非常有意义的，因此现在得到了更广泛的应用。

资本管制就是一个例子。在冰岛危机发生之前，业界主流是反对限制资本流动，欧盟体系甚至将其禁止。在冰岛，当一切都在崩溃时，就开始实行资本管制。冰岛仍然允许贸易进出口的支付，但不允许因纯粹金融目的而将冰岛货币带出国境。之所以这样做，是因为人们担心冰岛的资本会不断外流，这样冰岛克朗就会持续贬值，导致通货膨胀率越来越高。因此，在国际货币基金组织（IMF）的支持下，引入了停止资本控制的机制，这一方案在2019年和2020年被运用于阿根廷。

IMF总部

观察者网：这似乎表明，华盛顿共识是有局限性的。

伊加德：是的，有时你必须重新考虑动用的工具。在这种情况下，有一些特殊的工具是适用的，因为每个危机都有一些相似之处和一些不同之处。而冰岛当时的局势恰恰触发了对这种机制的需求。事实证明，这种机制在其他情况下也非常适用。

观察者网：本书成书后，出现了新冠疫情，过去几年也出现了各种经济状况。从当下再回过头看，您会更新书中的任何内容吗？

伊加德：我想我不会。新冠疫情非常严重，但我认为在世界历史上，它很快就会被看作是长期轨迹上的一个小插曲。我认为，我在新冠疫情之前写的东西，以及我对未来的评论，仍然非常有意义。我书中就曾写道，我们将面临通货膨胀问题。并不是说我有多么高超的预见能力，但至少有一些因素是你可以清楚地看到会发生的。

因此，我认为我的书对当下是有益的。重要的是，尤其是对于年轻人来说，要以史为鉴，因为金融危机不是每年都会发生，而是每10年、15年发生一次。如果你要通过自己的亲身经历来了解，那可能要等到老年，并在途中损失惨重。而如果你能根据冰岛的这段历史，花时间去阅读和了解它，那么你就会有所准备。如果你是投资者，如果你对经济政策感兴趣，如果你是政策制定者，无论你是谁，阅读相关资料都比亲身经历要便宜和好得多。

观察者网：冰岛的另一个成功之处在于，它最初的经济模式更依赖于自然资源的开采，并饱受通货膨胀、货币贬值等问题的困扰，但现在它的经济结构更加多元化。您认为这是否值得全球南方国家借鉴？

伊加德：我认为肯定是的。尽管冰岛是一个非常小的国家，但由于它的教育水平、企业家精神，包括社交媒体和数字平台的使用，使得国家能够繁荣昌盛。因为有了数字化技术和社交媒体平台等，在许多领域，大国经济规模带来的优势已经不复存在了。因此，冰岛能够发展服务业，发展旅游业，同时发展制造业。过去，冰岛的传统渔业以野生捕捞为主，现在则有养鱼为辅。

这一改变一定程度上是危机触发的，冰岛必须改变过去的做法。冰岛货币的大幅贬值也是原因之一，使得冰岛在一段时间内极具竞争力。但这也是由新技术、数字化和新的社交媒体引发的。因此，我认为这对所有国家来说都是一个启示，即你可以利用这些因素来实现增长和飞跃。

观察者网：在某一个行业的发展空间可能有限，因为如果其他国家试图参与进来，竞争将使发展变得更加困难。

伊加德：事实就是这样的。机会总是留给有准备的人，你要抓住它，然后其他国家想要复制你的成功，你只能做得更好，更努力，更有成效。这就是市场经济的挑战和魅力所在。

以下为英文原文：

Guancha: These recollections mostly date from 2009, but you had waited until 2020 to publish them, why this long wait?

Oygard: Many of these issues are quite sensitive, and I didn't want to destroy the lives of anyone. So sometimes it just takes a bit of time before everyone can look at things with openness and you can be completely open about this. I think that was one reason. And then it just took time to prepare it and consider my thoughts and reflection on it.

What's special with this book is that there are many books that tells the story about the challenges that leads up to a crisis. There's also quite a lot of books that tell about what happens in the midst of the crisis. As far as I know, this is the only books that also covers very extensively what happens after the crisis. And that in a main way is the most amazing part of the story.

How this was handled in the year thereafter, allowing Iceland to return to a trajectory of economic growth to solve the debt problems, and actually ending up with less debt post-crisis than they had pre-crisis. And I think, as far as I know, that's the only country in the world that has achieved that. That process took years, right? The crisis hit in 2008. And I think the finalization of all these processes among the debt holders, was in 2018, 10 years later.

Guancha: You had taken perhaps one of the most difficult jobs during one of the difficult period in Iceland's recent history. Why were you, a Norwegian. selected for the job and why did you take it? During this process, as a foreigner, what difficulties did you encounter?

Oygard: I was selected, I believe, because I was part of the team that worked on the Norwegian financial crisis that we had in the early nineties. There were many lessons that were also very applicable in Iceland. So when Iceland was in crisis, when there was a need for a governor and when they concluded that for a while, the interim governor should be Norwegian, should be a partner. They called on me to take the job.

Why did I take it? I took it because I first saw it as an honor to be called to such a position to help a neighboring country. And of course, I do like challenges. And I think at that time, this was the largest challenge that was available anywhere out there that I actually could take. So that was a great privilege to take that position.

Guancha: Why did you leave after just half a year?

Oygard: It's actually a peculiarity, in the sense that the constitution of Iceland says that the a public position cannot be held by foreigner. They could make an exemption for the interim governor, but not for a permanent governor. And therefore, that was the reasons why I only could stay for a short period of time. If not, they would have to change the constitution for the country. They did change the law to enable me taking that position. But if I were to stay, they would need to also change the constitution. And that's a big step for any country.

Guancha: I guess that does show that Iceland was quite desperate, such that they had to find some legal tweaks to get someone from outside of Iceland for fix their mess.

Oygard: Yes. The interesting part of it is, the Icelandic Constitution was written in 1262, I believe Iceland has the oldest parliament of any country, they came together in 1262 at the place called Thingvellir, and they said, this is how we want to rule the country and it should be following these rules. In it they specified that all senior civil servant position in Iceland should be held by Icelanders, but on 27th of February 2009 they changed the law and the day after I got the job.

Guancha: Why was Iceland the only place to allow systemic banks to collapse? Do you think this approach by Iceland was ultimately better or worse compared with the alternative?

Oygard: You had the saying in certain situations that the banks are too big to fail. In Iceland, the banks were too big to save. They were simply so large in proportion to the economy, and they were largely depending on foreign currency for their funding, dollars and euros and so on, that there was simply not enough currency available in the country to save the banks even if they wanted to.

So that was the reason why it collapsed, the fact that you couldn't save the banks, that the three of the banks in the country, basically more than 90% of the banking system, went bankrupt in a week, that had immense costs because it accentuated the crisis. But in the end, it also proved to have some benefits in the sense that the cost of saving the bank were not taken on by the country and the citizens.

Guancha: Regarding the US approach where the big banks were bailed out, lots of people said this created a moral hazard going forward; in your judgment, holistically, do you think that not saving it compare to saving it, which one would be better in the long term?

Oygard: I think it's hard to tell. I think of course, in general, the societal cost of allowing a bank to go down is incredibly large. It basically threatens the robustness of the entire financial system. It comes at the cost of a potential moral hazard in the sense as you say the owners might be incentivized to take on too much risks pre-crisis to drive earnings, knowing that the government will basically pay them out if it gets into trouble. But I think by now, there’s a pretty clear precedent at least among the equity owners, the owners of the bank, that most of their values will be taken away from them if the bank defaults. So I think the risk of moral hazard from the owner’s perspective is less of a challenge in the modern banking system.

Guancha: What lessons do Iceland's recovery hold for other countries, especially today?

Oygard: It definitely has very important lessons to most countries. The main lesson is that if you have a problem, solve it right. Make firm decisions early. Don't try to drag on and solve the problems gradually. And that was what Iceland did, different to many other countries that weren't able to solve the challenge.

I think one of the stories I can tell on that is more from an economic, financial perspective; normally, if the GDP of a country drops by 10 percentage point, it's a very severe economic crisis, if you were to lose 10% of income that would be bad, but it would generally be manageable, you just need to address the challenge. The problem is that too many countries spend too much time on discussing who should carry the burden, instead of just solving the problems. It's a bit like going to a restaurant with many friends and then you get a big restaurant bill; in the end you have to share the bill, decide amongst your friends how to share. What you shouldn't do is start to fight and tear down the whole restaurant. Unfortunately, that's basically what many countries are doing. They just spend time fighting on who should take the bill instead of sharing the bill in a fair and equivalent manner.

Guancha: Well, I guess if there is an opportunity for you to pay nothing and get other people to pay the bill, then that's when you're gonna do.

Oygard: You're right. I think it's linked to culture, it’s linked to the legitimacy of the political institutions, it’s linked to the perception of fairness. If some try to run away from the bill, then it's more difficult to solve it. In many ways, I think that's the benefit of Iceland and also many of the other Nordic countries that had all been hit by financial crises, Norway and Sweden early in the 90s, Denmark even earlier, and also Finland. So all of them have been through these crises, but all have been able to get through the crisis very quickly compare to countries like Greece and Spain and Italy and Argentina that basically has spent decades on striving to split the Bill as opposed to addressing it head on.

Guancha: Here in China, local governments and some companies have run into debt issues as you may have heard. Do you have any advice on how they can be resolved given the cultural and other context in China?

Oygard: I think it's hard for a foreigner to give advice to any country, also for China. But of course, what often happens is that there are companies that take on too much debt and that means the ownership value of the equity is too low compared to the debt. My general advice is to try whatever is possible to find a solution and even to convert part of the debt to equity and give the debt holders a stake in the enterprises. If you do that, most often you can solve the crisis without triggering a broader economic challenge to the total economy. So moving early, try to restructure the entities and deal with the problems as opposed to choosing a way to deal with it that leads to problems for the entire country.

Guancha: So moving back to 2008, regarding the cause of the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke believe that Congress and Wall Street had deliberately condoned real estate bubbles for their own purposes. Do you think that a similar crisis might happen again?

Oygard: Yes, for sure. Normally, the starting point for a financial crisis is that it's preceded by a situation with too much debt. Some entity, it could be a bank, it could be a country, it could be the household, it could be the government, takes up too much debt. By taking on debt, of course, you can grow the enterprises, you can grow the company, you can grow consumption quicker, and that of course looks attractive for many.

And that's the challenge. When you're in a bubble economy, where a lot of debt is taken on, you get what's perceived to be strong growth, people make more money, asset values increase; in any economic system, in particular in market based economy, there's always a temptation to take on too much debt. And if you take on too much debt, then you get crisis.

Right now, there's too much debt in the world and it's allocated in a way that leads to a risk of financial troubles.

Guancha: How do you think we can either change culture or structure society in some way to get more long term thinking instead of just a short term focus on GDP growth?

Oygard: I think one way is to be very diligent, observe what's happening very closely and that the institutions that are tasked to oversee these companies like IMF, but also the rating agencies, call out when they see this kind of things happening. For the policymakers, of course, to be prudent, for the banks themselves to be more risk averse and all of us not to fall for the temptation to earn a quick buck by taking on risk for ourselves and for the society.

Guancha: What do you think of the bank collapses this year? Do you think that central banks have taken the right approach in response?

Oygard: The starting point is that we have been through almost 20 years with ever decreasing rates of inflation, which then leads to ever decreasing interest rate levels. Many entities had basically adapted themselves to this situation. Then, with the rising inflation that is followed by high interest rate, many structures are challenged.

What was most surprising about these collapses was that they occurred at such an early point in the cycle. And of course, Silicon Valley Bank in itself is spectacular, that you actually can, can go bankrupt by government bonds, no one even thought that would be possible.

I think the central bank did what was appropriate. They moved in and they restructured the bank. They move the deposits to other institutions. They took on the debt. So I think it was done in a good way.

What's also been surprising is that it's been very quiet since then, nothing has happened for the last nine months, even though the process of increasing interest rate has continued. This means that most probably more will happen in the months to come. So I think we all should be prepared for that. I'm sure the financial supervisory agencies are prepared for that. I hope the central banks are prepared for that because we haven't seen the end of the troubles in this cycle.

Guancha: There's been a paradigm shift over the past two years from the previous paradigm of ever decreasing interest rate and little to no inflation. Now people even in Europe are seeing inflation and suddenly interest rate can go back up in a big way. Over the next few years, how do you think the world economy and businesses will adjust to this new reality?

Oygard: I think in that most of us in the western world, we're going to go through some painful years. We all get spoiled by having interest rates that went down year by year, now is increasing. And it's deliberate because that's the measure that used to fight the inflation. I think the inflationary pressure is still there, it’s actually quite strong. There’s all kinds of different reasons for that. But until the inflation pressure diminishes, the interest rate hike will continue.

What can companies do? To the extent that they don't have buffers, they need to build buffers, we all needs to be a bit cautious in the way we operate. And with that, hopefully, we will get through in a good way. Will there be a bumps along the way? Yes, definitely. And I think that's also something we need to be prepared for, maybe have more tolerance for banks to collapse occasionally, and it doesn't need to be the end of the world if the policymakers are decisive in the way they intervene.

Guancha: Do you think other countries could copy Iceland's great success or is it more specific to Iceland or a Nordic country?

Oygard: I think there are elements of it that are fairly useful. Imagine that you have a hundred patients, and they are all very sick, then there's one patient that gets a cure that's different from all others. That one patient initially was hit the hardest, but is also the one that recovers the most quickly. And that was Iceland. So of course, in certain situations, if that would be in medicine, we would look at that case and see what can we learn from it. Here in finance, we all need to look at that case and see what can be learned from it.

Guancha: Is this something that's still being explored or is there a consensus?

Oygard: I think there’s part of it where there's a consensus. I think a number of the tools and the approaches that was used to solve the Icelandic crisis, they have been taken on and even included in the toolbox of the IMF for their institution that works on this, to solve crises in other countries. Iceland has changed kind of the world in the sense that many of the mechanisms that they and we develop together in those years have actually proven to be very relevant and therefore now are applied more broadly.

One example is capital controls. Up until what happened in Iceland, the general rule, even forbidden in the European Union system, was you can’t limit capital movements. In Iceland, when everything collapsed, capital control was introduced. So it will still allow to, to move exports and imports back and forth and to pay for it, but you were not allowed to take Icelandic currency out of the country for pure financial reasons. And that was done because there was a fear that there will be a constant outflow of capital from Iceland so that the Icelandic Kroner would get weaker and weaker, leading to ever higher level of inflation. So with support of the IMF that actually earlier said this is forbidden, a mechanism to stop capital control was introduced and that tool has now been apply later, for example in Argentina in 2019, 2020.

Guancha: I guess that kind of shows that the Washington consensus has its limits.

Oygard: Yeah, sometimes you have to reconsider the tools. And in this situation, there were specific features that apply, because every crisis has some similarity and some differences. And here it just triggered a need for such a mechanism. And that mechanism actually proved to be quite relevant also for other situations.

Guancha: After publication, came Covid and the issues of the past few years. Would you update anything from your book given your vantage point now?

Oygard: No, not really. Covid was very serious, but I think in the history of the world, it will shortly be seen like a dip on a long term trajectory. I think what I wrote pre-Covid, also with regard to my comments of the future, are still very relevant. I also wrote in the book that we would get into this inflationary problem. So I'm not saying I have this fantastic foresight, but at least there were elements that you clearly could see would happen.

So I think it's all relevant. It's important, especially for the young people to learn from history, because financial crisis don't occur every year, instead they incur every 10,15 years, if you wait until your experience them yourself, you might be a very old man before you experience them, and you will lose a lot of money along the way. If you take the time to read about it and understand it based on this history from Iceland, then you will be prepared. If you're an investor, if you're a interested in economic policy, if you're a policymaker, whoever you are, it’s just cheaper and better to read about it as compared to having to live through it yourself.

Guancha: Another one of Iceland success was that initially it’s economic model was more reliant on natural resource extraction and was plagued by inflation, currency devaluation and the like. But now it's a more diversified economy. Do you think that's something developing countries in the Global south can learn from?

Oygard: I would say definitely, yes. Because of the level of education in the country, the entrepreneurism and even the use of social media and digital platforms, Iceland has, despite being a very small country, been able to prosper. In many areas, you could say the scale benefits of big countries have been taken away because, for example, of the digitalization technology and social media platform.

Therefore, Iceland has been able to grow in the service industry, has been able to grow in tourism, and also grow its manufacturing base. It used to have the traditional fisheries based on wild catch, now it has fish farming as a supplement.

It was to some extent triggered by the crisis, that people had to do something different. This was triggered by this immense weakening of the currency that made Iceland for a while very competitive. But it's also triggered by the new technologies, the digitalization and the new social media landscape. So I think it should be an inspiration for all countries that you can actually use these elements to grow and make a big jump forward.

Guancha: There may only be so much room within a specific industry, if other countries try to join, competition will make growth based on these industries more difficult.

Oygard: That's the way it is. You always have an opportunity and you move to seize it, and then if you're followed by others, then you just need to get better and work harder and be more productive. That's just the challenge and the beauty of the market economy.

Guancha: The current NATO secretary general Stoltenberg is also a member of the Norwegian Labor Party as you and you both had worked in the Ministry of finance and Norwegian Parliament before. Do you have any recollection, good or bad, from your encounters with him?

Oygard: I worked closely with them for 5, 6 years. When I was deputy Minister of Finance, he also worked in the government. And he actually even asked me, I'd tell the story in my book, he asked me to become minister of finance of Norway. I was called into his office and he made this request. I decided to turn it down because I had other plans.

I know him well. I know him to be a very dedicated professional, he’s an economist in training, he is well able to reflect on the questions that matters. His father was a diplomat. So I think he also has brought with him the ability to pursue what he thinks is right, but also in a way that brings people together. So I think he’s a strong character and it was also a pleasure working with him. And of course, he's doing important work as Secretary General of NATO.

Guancha: He was supposed to retire this year, returning to financing. But now he has to keep on being the NATO secretary general.

Oygard: As an economist, one of the most prestigious positons is to be the Central Banker governor. I think his secret dream has been to become the central bank governor of Norway, and actually he visited me in Iceland when I was there. He wanted to become central bank governor and had applied, but then he was asked by by NATO, by the president of the USA himself to stay on as NATO Secretary General, then he need to let go of his childhood dream of being a central bank governor to take on the position at NATO. But as I said, when I was appointed central governor of Iceland, my first visitor in the central bank was actually Jen Stoltenberg, who by coincidence was at Iceland. So we discussed the challenge that I had and he gave some good advice along the way, which was valuable given his knowledge and at that time position as the Prime Minister of Norway.

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